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基思·亨尼西(Hennessey)的博客

美国前国家经济委员会主任、乔治·布什的首席经济顾问Keith Hennessey

 
 
 

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美国的气候策略:中印岂能成为漏网之鱼?  

2009-05-26 10:01:43|  分类: 默认分类 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

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[点击查看Keith Hennessey的英文博客]

 

美国众议院能源和商业委员会本周把应对气候变化的《马基和维克斯曼法案》(Markey-Waxman限额交易法案)提上议程。他们的讨论主要集中在法案的国内影响以及政策设计对美国各选区的影响上。我在这里想退一步,从美国政策制定者的角度探讨这样一个法案在全球气候战略中的意义。

 

本文暂不讨论科学问题,这里要谈的是战略。既然如此,我先断定气候变化会带来长期的环境破坏,而且人们至少应该考虑制定相关政策来应对这样的风险——至于事实究竟是否如此,我保留重新考虑的权利。实际上,美国的决策者就是根据这样的假设行事的,然而他们却缺乏一套完整的气候战略,我这里想探讨的正是这样做产生的后果。

 

我将使用美国能源部能源情报署(EIA)的数据(EIA的数据和分析向来严密、可靠、公正),也就是2006年二氧化碳的排放量。理想状况下我们本可以比较所有温室气体的排放量,可是我认为分析二氧化碳的排放量就足以说明问题了。

 

国际上对气候变化的辩论主要在于该如何把世界各国分类:是大国对小国,还是富国对穷国。2007年以前全球气候变化谈判一般分为两大阵营:“发达”(富裕)国家和“发展中”(非富裕)国家。联合国气候变化框架公约(UNFCCC)把发达国家称作“附件二”国家,并假定这些富裕国家将为全球温室气体减排承担大部分的经济负担。

 

按公约规定,附件二国家要提供资金,帮助发展中国家开展减排活动并适应气候变化带来的负面影响。

 

根据能源情报署2006年的数据,17个国家的二氧化碳排放量占了全世界约四分之三。我们姑且把这些国家称为“大国”。其他的175个国家占了剩余的四分之一,这里我把它们归为“小国”。

 

2007年,布什总统开启了所谓的“主要经济体机制”,也就是世界上最大的几个经济体召开会议试图达成有关气候变化的协议。如果成功的话,该协议将是很好的起点,可逐渐把讨论扩大到UNFCCC所有192个成员国当中。目前为止,“主要经济体机制”颇有成效,已被奥巴马政府沿用。

 

下面的图表展示了两种分类方法,把世界各国分为四组。UNFCCC把国家分为发达国家和发展中国家,这种分法可见于表格中的上下两行,第一行的国家要承担的责任更大。“主要经济体机制”的分法则可见于表格的左右两列,它基于的假设是既然排放量占四分之三的17个国家能够达成协议,那么跟其他国家达成协议该更容易些。跟192个国家同时同地进行谈判相当困难,而很显然,中国对全球气候的影响要比布基纳法索大的多。

 

 

主要

非主要

发达

 

 

 

澳大利亚
加拿大
欧盟
法国
德国
意大利
日本
英国
美国

 

 

(9个国家, 约占2006年全球36%的二氧化碳排放量)

奥地利
比利时
丹麦
芬兰
希腊
冰岛
爱尔兰
卢森堡
荷兰
新西兰
挪威
葡萄牙
西班牙
瑞典
瑞士

 

(15个国家, 约占2006年全球5%的二氧化碳排放量)

发展中

 

 

 

巴西
中国
印度
印度尼西亚
朝鲜
墨西哥
俄罗斯
南非

(8个国家, 约占2006年全球38%的二氧化碳排放量)

其他国家

 

 

 

 

 

(160个国家, 约占2006年全球21%的二氧化碳排放量)

来源:美国能源情报署关于二氧化碳的数据

 

进一步简化之后,我们就能看到在2006年,世界上最大的四个二氧化碳排放国占了全球排放量的一半:

排名

 

2006年二氧化碳排放量(以百万公吨为单位)

占世界总排放量的百分比

占世界总排放量的累计百分比

1

中国

6,018

21%

21%

2

美国

5,903

20%

41%

3

俄罗斯

1,704

6%

47%

4

印度

1,293

4%

51%

5

日本

1,247

4%

55%

6

德国

858

3%

58%

来源:美国能源情报署关于二氧化碳的数据

 

中国和美国的二氧化碳排放量在世界上遥遥领先于其他国家,分别比第三名到第七名的排放量加起来还要多。中国最近赶超了美国,而且鉴于中国快速的工业化进程,它的排放量与第二名的差距可能会拉大。如果你认为我们应该使全球排放的增长放缓,那么数据摆在面前,不仅要管美国,还要管中国、俄罗斯和印度。这几个国家总排放量超过全球的30%,如果它们照排不误,那么指望未来全球温室气体排放大幅减少显然是不现实的。如果加上其他五个主要发展中国家(巴西、印度尼西亚、朝鲜、墨西哥、南非)的7%,或者其他160个小型发展中国家的21%的话,那么我的论点就更明显了。

 

气候变化对各国的影响迥然不同。有的不同体现在地理上:全球变暖也许会对俄罗斯有好处,因为他们可以减少供暖成本并增加耕地面积;海平面大幅上升对低洼岛国影响尤为突出。另外还有些差异是经济上的:向美国这样的富裕国家可以比贫穷国家更好的适应环境变化。鉴于这种种差异,各国就应对严峻的长期气候变化带来的风险问题会有不同的看法。比如说,如果忽视外交的考虑,纯粹从一国私利出发,那么俄罗斯政府应该没有理由会牺牲任何利益来阻止全球变暖。

 

一个国家限制碳排放的政策形式不如政策的影响范围重要。当然,限额交易政策与碳税相比有重大的差别,但是为了讨论方便,本文暂且认为可以把它们的差别忽略不计,并假设一个国家不断增加对碳排放征收的价格,无论是直接通过征税,还是间接通过限额来达到这目的。不断增加的碳排放价格能部分或全部解决我们之前断定的碳排放对(全球)环境的破坏问题。而这个价格会使国家的经济发展放缓,因为它会导致能源价格的普遍上升。

 

这里的战略挑战(对全球而言,不仅对美国)在于,中俄印三国是占有巨额排放比例的大型经济体。他们目前还没有表态要自觉实施不断增加的碳价格,并让自己的经济体承受相应的经济负担。

 

那么,对美国来说什么才是理性的战略呢?为了使谈判过程清晰化,我来设计一个更简单的例子。我们假设世界上只有两个国家,美国和中国,各占一半的碳排放量。再假设,排放一吨二氧化碳会给世界带来30美元的损失,而且损失也是两个国家平均分配,美国和中国各承担15美元的损失。

 

这时候,我猜想庇古俱乐部(格里高利?曼昆)的成员一定会说:“在全世界强制征收每吨30美元的碳税/价,不就万事大吉了吗?只要坚持稳妥地推行下去,市场就能解决其他问题。个人会合理地平衡碳排放活动的成本和收益。既清洁,又简单,而且公正,何乐而不为呢?”

 

可是,万一中国政府说:“我们不打算为了限制碳排放而强加征收额外的成本。我们没有碳税,而且如果我们实施限额的话,额度也会足够的高,不至于减少经济发展。我们很乐意采用节能技术和限制传统的污染,这些措施也能减少温室气体的排放。可是我们不会对中国经济征收不断增加的碳价。我们认为短期经济增长比几十年甚至几百年后可能出现的气候变化收益要重要得多。”

 

那么,美国又有什么选择呢?我认为,美国决策者要先做两个抉择才能制定完整的战略:

 

1. 要说服中国政府跟其他国家一起征收不断增加的碳价,我们应该使用何种工具呢?(单选或多选)

A. 领导力:美国以身作则,带头实施碳价。然后使用外交手段试图说服中国。

B. 胡萝卜:美国为中国的减排买单。

C. 大棒:如果中国政府不合作,美国对中国进口的商品征收关税。

 

2. 如果中国的碳价为零,那么美国自己设定的碳价应该是多少?

A. 30美元。我们很无私,愿意为自己的排放对世界的破坏负责。

B. 15美元。我们愿意为自己的排放对美国的破坏负责。

C. 0美元。如果中国不合作,我们也不行动。

 

在第一个抉择里,我们要考虑每种工具的有效性,这种工具在多大程度上能说服中国政府改变政策。这个问题各大智库以及外交人员都应慎重考虑。

 

选项A的问题在于可能会没有效果。在一个真正的全球背景下(不是简化的两国模型),我相信道义和外交劝说还是有效的,但是我怀疑单纯靠外交手段能把30美元/吨的缺口填补多少。

要实现选项B,美国可以直接增加税收,然后直接转移给中国。或者可以像Waxman-Markey法案提出的那样在美国实施限额排放。如果美国政策允许美国的碳排放者向中国企业购买“碳抵消”的话,那么在这样的政策下,我们减排最高效的方法就是把美国的资源转移到中国。这就是欧洲人一直以来的做法。可是,我想大多数美国人以及他们在国会的代表应该不会接受这一点。

选项C可能会导致全球贸易战。在真实的世界里,我们所征收的关税可能会对使用中国货的美国消费者产生负面影响,而其他国家可能不会征收关税。中国政府届时将不会改变他们的碳政策,反而会减少对美国出口,转而把商品出口到别的国家。

 

就第二个抉择而言,我们要考虑,中国的企业和工人会跟美国的企业和工人展开竞争。美国自觉征收的碳价与中国碳价的差额,对美国企业和工人来说,将会是直接的可测的劣势。如果我们自己征收30美元/吨的碳价,而中国碳价为零的话,那么美国的企业和工人在跟中国的竞争对手较量时,将会困难重重。

 

Waxman-Markey法案试图通过让美国纳税人给利益受损的企业补贴从而解决这一问题。撇开政府无法准确计算补贴的问题不说,也先不管这是否会变成一个寻租的机制,这个所谓的解决办法不过把成本从一部分美国人转移到另一部分美国人的头上。美国人所承受的经济劣势没有得到根本解决。

 

美国似乎找不到一个十拿九稳的战略来说服中国、印度和俄罗斯自觉征收大幅上调的碳排放价格。

 

政府及其国会联盟正试图通过类似Waxman-Markey的法案从而在美国强制实施碳价的征收,同时还要加入国际谈判进程,而国际上高达60%的碳排放只征收小额甚至为零的碳价。这样很可能造成世界经济局势的严重不公,让中国和印度的工人和企业获利,而让美国受损。同时,也无法化解全球气候变化带来的风险,因为大部分的碳排放仍然得不到限制。

 

从美国的角度看,此举相当不明智。这样的气候变化战略是有漏洞的,结果,中国、印度以及其他发展中大国都成为了漏网之鱼。

 

我想给政府和支持Waxman-Markey法案的众议院成员提出以下问题:

 

1. 我们知道,中印俄三国占了全球30%的排放量,美国显然也缺乏完整的策略来让这些国家的政府对自己的工人和企业征收碳价。那么现在,在无法得知未来的经济和排放情况的前提下,你们愿意给美国工人和企业征收多大的额外价格?

 

2. 你们有什么策略能让中印俄三国政府对自己的工人和企业征收与美国相当的碳价?

 

3. 鉴于碳价对美国工人和企业竞争力的影响,在国际谈判进程结束的时候,你们认为在美国碳价与中印碳价之间多大的差额是可以接受的呢?因为美国比中印俄及其他发展中国家富裕,所以你们都愿意牺牲利益,那么你们愿意在多大程度上让美国工人和企业承受竞争劣势呢?

 

我想,这些问题的答案比Waxman-Markey法案的任何细节都更为重要,而且在国会还没有找到这些答案之前,立法者不应轻举妄动。

 

如果政府及其国会联盟真的打算强制加大美国工人和企业的成本,那么我们起码应该有一套完备的战略。

 

(我恳求各位看官舍弃往常对科学证据的细究,把精力集中在这些战略问题上。有意评论者请注意:我希望我们能开展激烈而又文明的辩论。)(翻译:魔陀)

 

 (翻译纠错。读者发现任何翻译错误请发邮件给我们,谢谢:caijingblog#126.com 将#改为@)

 


英文原文(地址:http://keithhennessey.com/2009/05/22/incomplete-climate-strategy/):

 

    The China/India hole in the American climate strategy

  The House Energy and Commerce Committee marked up the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade climate change bill this week.  Much of the discussion focused on the domestic impacts of the legislation, and how the policy design would affect various American constituencies.  I would like to zoom out and think about how a policy like Waxman-Markey fits into a global strategic climate context, from the perspective of American policymakers.

I’m going to punt on the scientific questions in this post.  I want to focus on strategy instead.  For now I will stipulate that there is a significant enough risk of long-term environmental damage that policy actions should at least be considered to address that risk.  I reserve the right to reconsider this later.  From a practical standpoint, U.S. policymakers are headed down a path that makes this presumption, and I want to explore the consequences of their lack of a complete climate strategy.

< our serve should data emissions CO2 the think I but emissions, gas greenhouse all compared that have would we Ideally 2006.  in for is This analysis.  and unbiased reliable, rigorous, produces EIA Energy.  of Department U.S. at (EIA) Administration Information Energy from use will>

The international climate change debate centers on two ways to divide up countries for a climate discussion:  big vs. small, and rich vs. not rich.  Before 2007, global climate change negotiations were structured based on countries that were either “developed” (rich) or “developing” (not rich).  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) calls the developed countries “Annex II” countries, and assumes that these rich countries will bear a disproportionate share of the economic burden of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions:

[Annex II countries] are required to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change.

According to EIA, in 2006 seventeen countries accounted for about three-fourths of all CO2 emissions.  Let’s think of these as the “big” nations.  The other 175 countries account for the other quarter of CO2 emissions.  I think of them as relatively “small” in this context.

In 2007, President Bush created the “Major Economies” process, in which the largest economies meet as a group to see if they can reach agreement on climate change.  If they are successful, that agreement can serve as the starting point for a broader discussion involving all 192 countries in the UNFCCC.  The Major Economies process has been productive so far, and has been continued by the Obama Administration.

This table shows how these two approaches divide countries into four groups.  The UNFCCC developed/developing breakdown is the separation between the rows of the table, in which there are greater obligations imposed on countries in the top row than in the bottom row.  The Major Economies process is the separation between the columns of the table, based on the presumption that if the seventeen countries that represent about three-fourths of global emissions can reach agreement, then it should be much easier to get agreement with everyone else.  It’s hard to negotiate with 192 countries in the same room, and clearly China has a bigger impact on the global climate than Burkina Faso.

Major

Not major

Developed




Australia
Canada
European Union
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States




(9 countries, about 36% of global CO2 emissions in 2006)

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland




(15 countries, about 5% of global CO2 emissions in 2006)

Developing




Brazil
China
India
Indonesia
Korea
Mexico
Russia
South Africa




(8 countries, about 38% of global CO2 emissions in 2006)

everyone else




(160 countries, about 21% of global CO2 emissions in 2006)

Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration for CO2 data

To simplify even further, we can see that the four biggest CO2 emitters in 2006 accounted for half the global total:

Rank

Millions of Metric Tons of CO2 (2006)

% of world total

cumulative % of world total

1

China

6,018

21%

21%

2

U.S.

5,903

20%

41%

3

Russia

1,704

6%

47%

4

India

1,293

4%

51%

5

Japan

1,247

4%

55%

6

Germany

858

3%

58%

Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration for CO2 data

China and the U.S. dominate everyone else in CO2 emissions.  Each is larger than the next five biggest emitters combined.  China has recently passed the U.S., and the gap is expected to grow as China industrializes at a rapid rate.  If you believe that we need to slow the growth of global emissions, the arithmetic demands that you slow the growth of emissions not just from the U.S., but also from (China + Russia + India).  It is arithmetically infeasible to get significant reductions in future total global greenhouse gas emissions if this >30% of the total is allowed to grow unchecked.  This point is only strengthened if you include the additional 7% from the five other major developing economies:  Brail, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa, or if you include the additional 21% from the 160 small developing countries.

There are huge national differences in the effects of climate change.  Some differences are geographic:  Russia would probably benefit from a warmer planet, as they would face lower heating costs and have more arable land.  Low-lying island states are at greater risk from a significant sea rise.  Other differences are economic:  a rich country like the U.S. can better adapt to a changed environment than can a poor country.  These differences mean that that countries will have different views on the importance of addressing the risk of severe long-term climate change.  As an example, if one ignores diplomatic considerations, from a pure national self-interest standpoint it is hard to see why the government of Russia should sacrifice anything to keep the planet from warming.

For the sake of this discussion, the form of a national policy that limits a country’s carbon emissions is less important than the size of that effect.  There are important differences between a cap-and-trade policy and a carbon tax, but for the sake of this discussion I think we can hand-wave past them and just think of a country imposing an incremental price added to the cost of carbon emissions, either directly through a tax, or indirectly through a quantity-limiting cap.  A positive carbon price addresses some or all of the damage that we’re stipulating is done to the (global) environment by your carbon emissions.  This price results in slower economic growth in your country, as it generally raises the price of energy.

The strategic challenge (for the world, not just the U.S.) is that the governments of China, Russia, and India are big economies with big shares of total world emissions.  They have so far not indicated any willingness to self-impose a positive carbon price, and its resulting economic burden, on their economies.

What, then, is the rational American strategy?  Let me construct a much simpler example to crystallize the negotiating issues.  Let’s pretend we live in a two-country world, the U.S. and China, and that each emits half of the world’s total carbon emissions.  Let’s further assume that a ton of carbon emissions does $30 of damage to the world, and that the damage is again split evenly, so that a ton of carbon emissions from either nation does $15 of damage to the U.S. and $15 of damage to China.

I imagine a member of Greg Mankiw’s Pigou Club might say, “Just impose a global carbon tax/price of $30 per ton of carbon and you’re done.  The market will handle everything else, as long as you have solid and consistent enforcement.  Individual actors will then appropriately balance the costs and benefits of their carbon-producing actions.  It’s clean, simple, and fair.”

But suppose the government of China says, “We’re not going to impose any additional cost on the Chinese economy to limit our carbon emissions.  No carbon tax, or if we agree to a cap, it will be sufficiently high that we are confident it won’t require us to slow our economic growth.  We are happy to do things like adopt energy efficiency technologies and limit more traditional forms of pollution, and some of those actions will also result in reduced greenhouse gas emissions.  But we are not going to impose a positive price of carbon on the Chinese economy.  Near-term economic growth is far more important to us than possible long-term climate change benefits decades or centuries from now.”

What, then, are the U.S. options?  I think there are two decisions U.S. policymakers need to make to have a complete strategy:

  1. What tools should we use to try to convince the government of China to impose a positive carbon price as part of a global effort?  (choose one or more)
    1. Leadership:  U.S. goes first and self-imposes a price.  Then we use diplomacy to try to convince the Chinese to do the same.
    2. Carrots:  The U.S. pays the Chinese to reduce their emissions.
    3. Sticks:  The U.S. imposes import tariffs on Chinese goods as long as the government China does not impose a carbon price.
  2. What carbon price should we set in the U.S. while the government of China is telling us they’re at zero?
    1. $30 – We are altruistic and will account for all damages that U.S. emissions do to the world.
    2. $15 – We will account for all damages that U.S. emissions do to the U.S.
    3. $0 – We will wait until China joins us.

On decision (1), we need to consider the effectiveness of each tool:  how likely is it to convince the government of China to change their policy?  This is a question for the intelligence community and diplomats.

The risk of (1A) is that it could be ineffective.  In a true global context (rather than my simplified two-country example), I believe there is power in moral and diplomatic suasion, but I question how much of a $30/ton gap diplomacy alone can close.

In (1B), the payments can be direct through higher U.S. taxes and direct transfers to China.  Or we could follow the path of the Waxman-Markey bill and cap U.S. emissions.  If the U.S. policy then allows U.S. emitters to buy carbon offsets from Chinese firms, we would be choosing a policy that will transfer American resources to China as the most efficient path to reductions in carbon emissions.  This what the Europeans have been doing.  I think this is probably unacceptable to most Americans and their representatives in Congress.

(1C) risks starting a global trade war.  In a world with more than two countries, it is also possible that we would impose a tariff that would hurt American consumers of Chinese goods, and other nations would not do the same.  The government of China might then choose not to change their carbon policy, and instead just sell more goods to countries other than America.

On decision (2), we need to consider that firms and workers in China compete with firms and workers in the United States.  The difference between the self-imposed U.S. and Chinese carbon prices is a direct and measurable disadvantage to U.S. firms and workers relative to their Chinese counterparts.  So if we preemptively impose a $30/ton of carbon price in the U.S. while China has a zero carbon price, then we are significantly handicapping American firms and American workers relative to their Chinese competitors.

The Waxman-Markey bill attempts to solve this problem by having U.S. taxpayers subsidize those disadvantaged firms.  Setting aside the impossibility of a government accurately targeting those subsidies, and ignoring the likelihood that this will become a rent-seeking regulatory process, this solution merely shifts the costs from one subset of the U.S. to another.  The underlying economic disadvantage to Americans would remain unaddressed.


America appears to lack a high-probability strategy for how to get China, India, and Russia to agree to self-impose a significant positive carbon price.

The Administration and its Congressional allies are trying to impose a significant carbon price in the U.S. through something like the Waxman-Markey bill, while entering an international negotiation process in which as much as 60% of global carbon emissions could face little to no carbon price.  The likely outcome would dramatically tilt the global economic playing field, harming U.S. workers and firms relative to their counterparts in China and India.  At the same time, it would make little progress toward addressing the risk of severe global climate change, as a large portion of global carbon emissions would remain effectively uncapped.

From an American standpoint this seems extremely unwise.  It is an incomplete climate change strategy, with a hole about how to deal with China, India, and other large developing nations.

Here are questions for the Administration and those House Members supporting the Waxman-Markey bill:

  1. Given that China, India, and Russia account for 30% of global carbon emissions, and given the apparent lack of a high-probability American strategy to convince their governments to impose a carbon price on their workers and firms, how large of an additional cost are you willing to impose now on U.S. workers and firms before knowing the likely economic and emissions endpoints?
  2. What is your strategy to get the governments of China, India, and Russia to impose a carbon price on their economies that is comparable to the one you would impose on American workers and firms?
  3. Given the competitive effects on American workers and firms, how big of a difference between the carbon price imposed by the U.S. and that imposed by China and India is acceptable at the end of the international negotiating process?  How much of a competitive disadvantage are you willing to impose on U.S. workers and firms because the U.S. is comparatively wealthy relative to China, India, Russia, and other developing countries?

I believe the answers to these questions are more important than any detail of the Waxman-Markey bill, and that legislation should not move forward until Congress has answers to each of these questions.

If the Administration and its Congressional allies are going to propose imposing large costs on American workers and firms, let’s at least have a complete strategy.

(I would ask and challenge commenters to focus on these strategic questions, rather than the usual scientific back-and-forth.  And please remember the comments policy:  I hope we can have a vigorous and yet civil debate.)

英文原文地址:http://keithhennessey.com/2009/05/22/incomplete-climate-strategy/

 

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